EVOLVING ARMY LEADER TRAINING: ADAPTING FOR GWOT EXPERIENCED JUNIOR LEADERS

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USAWC CLASS OF 2009

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)* 10-03-2009	2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	
Evolving Army Leader Training: Adapting for GWOT Experienced Junior Leaders	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)	
Colonel Malcolm B. Frost	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Colonel Alan G. Bourque Department of Command, Leadership, and Management	

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013	
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Distribution A: Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

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The hallmark and core of Army training and leader development remains a highly structured, organized, and centralized system. If this system does not adapt, flex, and evolve in parallel with the demands of Junior Leaders from the Millennial Generation, the Army will incur serious and unintended consequences. Should the Army sustain the status quo it could lose its leadership edge, waste the experience gained during GWOT, disenfranchise its Junior Leader Millennials, and marginalize its future. This puts the Army at risk of becoming a force hollow at its leader core unable to fulfill requirements in support of U.S. National Security and Military Strategy.

This project studies the generational differences in Army leaders and the structure that both influences and develops today's leader training system. Further it will demonstrate how the Army must adapt and change its leader training system to maximize the lessons learned by Junior Leader Millennials during GWOT deployments.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Junior Leaders: Millennial Generation, Senior Leaders: Generation X, Very Senior Leaders: Baby Boomer Generation

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFED	UNLIMITED	32	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PAPER

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TITLE: Evolving Army Leader Training: Adapting for GWOT Experienced
                   Junior Leaders

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 March 2009   WORD COUNT: 6,506   PAGES: 32

KEY TERMS: Junior Leaders: Millennial Generation, Senior Leaders: Generation
                   X, Very Senior Leaders: Baby Boomer Generation

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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EVOLVING ARMY LEADER TRAINING: ADAPTING FOR GWOT EXPERIENCED JUNIOR LEADERS

The United States Army's Junior Leaders are exactly what Army Senior Leaders and Very Senior Leaders want them to be: creative, adaptive, flexible, and agile leaders who think strategically and act decisively. The combat environment within the Global War on Terror (GWOT) forces them to develop these leadership traits.

The hallmark and core of Army training and leader development remains a highly structured, organized, and centralized system. This system employs strict management oversight and a checklist centric approach developed by the Army's current Very Senior Leaders who are from the Baby Boom Generation. This training and leader doctrine is comfortably executed by the Army's Senior Leaders from Generation X.

If this system does not adapt, flex, and evolve in parallel with the demands of Junior Leaders from the Millennial Generation, the Army will incur serious and unintended consequences. Should the Army sustain the status quo it could lose its leadership edge, waste the experience gained during GWOT, disenfranchise its Junior Leader Millennials, and marginalize its future. This puts the Army at risk of becoming a force hollow at its leader core unable to fulfill requirements in support of US National Security and Military Strategy.

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Army Leader Generations

To understand the differences in leaders and generations and how they fit into the current Army leader training model, it is necessary to define the generations. The Baby Boom Generation was born between 1943 and 1960, Generation X was born between 1960 and 1980,[1] and the new rising generation, termed Millennials, was born after 1981.[2]

In today's Army, these generational divisions break down into Very Senior Leaders (Baby Boomers), Senior Leaders (Generation Xers), and Junior Leaders (Millennials). There are 2,233 Very Senior Leader Boomers who serve in the officer ranks of Colonel through 4-star General. 42,387 Senior Leader Xers serve in the officer ranks of senior Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel. Lastly, 21,578 Junior Leader Millennials serve in officer company grade ranks of Second Lieutenant through junior Captain. Overwhelmingly, Junior Leaders serve at the tactical level and accordingly are called upon most during GWOT.[3]

Very Senior Leader Boomers grew up during a time of economic prosperity. They are optimistic, have a relentless work ethic, and tend to give family activities and personal goals secondary consideration.[4] Senior Leader Xers are the neglected latch key generation that arrived without fanfare. They are self-reliant, independent, confident, and tend to be distrustful of authority.[5] Junior Leader Millennials, in contrast to Senior Leader Xers, are trustful of authority. They desire coddling and are more comfortable in a team or group environment. Generally they are a happier generation.[6] These are the generations who serve in the Army and utilizing these categorizes, we can use this information to examine the Army Leader Training Model and how it needs to adapt to maximize the potential of these combat proven Junior Leader Millennials.

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<u>The Global Security Challenge</u>

We are living in an era of extreme and continuous change. Technology advances in huge leaps, globalized economies are interdependent, resources become scarce as populations explode, and instant access to information shatters knowledge barriers. This witch's brew of change can breed interminable conflict. While change and its challenges and promises are one of history's immutable footnotes, leaders in today's Army must confront a global environment characterized by "hyper-change." Giant leaps in technology, compressed, interrelated, and ever-changing decision cycles, and actions that result in multiple vectors of unintended consequences occurring at accelerated rates when compared to the past defines hyper-change. This era will force the U.S. and its leaders to address a previously unpredicted period of hyper-change fraught with potential for "hyper-promise" and "hyper-peril."

Compressed response time and global interconnectivity hyper-accelerate the need for government and leader action. Leaders have less time to think and analyze in the short term, have more stakeholders at play, and are handicapped by immediate priorities at the expense of long term results.[7] This dynamic is a result of the hyper-change going on in the world today.

In the post-Cold War era, the world is experiencing a significant sea change in the nature of conflict. It is very rare to find nation-states engaging in cross-border conventional war. The rise of non-state and individual actors changed how, where and why conflicts occur, who they affect, and how they end. Since 1990, political negotiations ended 58 conflicts whereas military action ended 28 conflicts worldwide producing the first substantial era in modern history where negotiations end conflict at a higher rate than military victory.[8]

Modern conflict is changing through the rise of terrorism, radical non-state actors, cross border international criminal organizations, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Some are lone threats and others are increasingly complex, hybrid organizations that combine some or all of these threats. They are becoming nearly immune to conventional attack methods. In 2007, approximately 14,000 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide resulting in over 22,000 deaths, which is a 9% increase in deaths from 2006.[9] Many of these terrorist and non-state entities are actively pursuing WMD capabilities along with volatile nations such as North Korea and Iran.

Modern conflict is also discernible by intrastate conflict within developing nations vice interstate war between developed nations. This has cascading consequences that changes both the nature of war and its effects. War was once fought near borders over territorial and political disputes. Now there are rises in displaced populations at these same borders who flee in search of safety from the source of internal conflict within their nations. Civilian refugee camps are created. These camps are rife with disease and marked by lack of food, water, and shelter in regions far from energy and natural resource distribution points and transportation networks. An insatiable global appetite whose demand for food will increase by 70-80% in 50 years and where up to 20% of global fresh water use will exceed long term accessible supply only exacerbates these regional problems.[10]

Additionally, noncombatants now comprise the overwhelming majority of casualties from conflicts. Estimates show that noncombatants comprise 75% of casualties in today's conflicts versus less than 5% in World War I.[11] Since the majority of

modern conflict occurs overwhelmingly in developing nations, this trend will likely

continue as the population of developing countries will to rise by 49% by 2025.[12]

Advances in technology and information flow also continue at an exponential

rate. Soon all of the "have not" population of the world will know what the "have"

population possesses and they truly lack. In 2007, half of the 6.5 billion people in the

world had cellular phones versus just 2 billion two years prior and subscriber rates are

increasing annually in developing nations by 25% and in Africa by 50%.[13] Computer and

internet access in developing nations continues to rise at meteoric rates.[14]

Blog and internet research is exploding, distance learning and education is

becoming standard, and the ability of non-state and individual actors to influence their

followers, the public, and the media are immediate realities that will continue to spread.

The world's internet users increased 400% from 2000 to 2008 from nearly 361 million to

1.46 billion current users. The largest increases are in developing regions of the world

demonstrated by an over 1,000% increase in the Middle East and Africa.[15] This

unprecedented access to information and technology provides great opportunity. Failure

to monitor and control this capability can facilitate the spread of radical, violent

ideologies, undermine governments and large corporations, and provide international

links and resources to adversaries of the free world.

Change in the international security environment occurs throughout modern

history to provide challenges and opportunities to governments and their leaders.

However, today's era of hyper-change whereby these factors are increasingly

interwoven, complex, and fast paced creates unique dynamics and hyper-challenges for

the U.S in an ever-shrinking, ever-linked global security environment. This era needs

leaders comfortable with rapid variations and constantly shifting conditions that possess the nature, capability, and experience to think, react, and adapt to change. Inside the U.S. Army, the generation best suited to thrive in this environment is the Junior Leader Millennial generation.

<u>The Army's Generational Challenges</u>

General George W. Casey Jr., 36th U.S. Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) recently emphasized that in today's global security environment that is marked by persistent conflict, leadership is dominant and the Army must develop agile and adaptive leaders who can succeed in a full spectrum environment.[16] When directing how to develop adaptive leaders, Army policy states that the force is both preparing Soldiers for war and developing multi-skilled leaders able to flourish in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) environment.[17]

As the Army and its Very Senior Leaders continue to tout the extreme need for agile, adaptive, and multi-skilled leaders, they fail to realize what to do with them now that they are permeating the force. By the very definition of their generational traits, the Army's Junior Leaders were postured to be leaders who *lacked* the traits required of today's leaders. Luckily, war intervened. Both Senior Leaders and Junior Leaders find themselves thrust into VUCA environments, given limited guidance, provided open ended mission statements, and responsible for large areas and population centers.

It is physically and psychologically impossible for Very Senior Leaders to put in place centralized, structured, and micromanaged systems to run the current war at the operational and tactical level. First, there is too much to manage and second, Very Senior Leaders have little experience with long term, full spectrum counterinsurgency

conflict. They entered an Army experienced in counterinsurgency warfare from Viet Nam and found themselves part of an organization reeling from this conflict. They were sworn to never repeat the mistakes of Viet Nam and emerged into a professional all-volunteer force that looked nothing like the Army in Viet Nam. This all volunteer Army succeeded in the Cold War and conflicts in the 1990s.

The Generation X officers in the Army who remained after the downsizing in the early 1990s reinforce the perspectives of their generational traits. These Senior Leaders of today are distrustful of an institution that issues pink slips to officers with fifteen years service in the Army. Yet they are confident and independent enough to build on and thrive in the strict, organized, and centrally led training models from the early-mid '90s.

Senior Leaders capitalized on both of these facets to become highly successful at the tactical level in conflicts including Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Liberia despite their lack of peacekeeping training. These Senior Leaders are not an enigma, but instead a sophisticated hybrid group of leaders able to bridge generations. They are highly successful inside the rigid garrison training design of Very Senior Leaders. Despite their distrust and cynicism of the Army, they were able to rely on their confident, independent nature to succeed at the tactical level in the conflicts of the '90s. Their nature, skills, and experiences make Senior Leader Xers uniquely able to bridge between the Army's Very Senior Leader Boomers and Junior Leader Millennials.

Senior Leaders are able to understand the GWOT environment. They can shape it at the tactical level and decentralize execution to Junior Leaders. The results from Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom also show the Army's Junior Leaders are more

creative, adaptive, confident, and able to deal with the complexities of

counterinsurgency and nation building operations in a VUCA environment.[18]

The Army and its Very Senior Leaders are caught in a conundrum. They

recognize the traits our Junior Leaders need and espouse them at every turn. Ironically,

there are Junior Leaders overflowing with GWOT experience and exhibiting these traits

throughout the force today. Despite this fact, the Army by no means set in motion basic

changes to the fundamental leader training model it uses to further develop these traits

and skills. Fundamental change across the Training and Leader Development domains

will challenge Junior Leader Millennials throughout their careers and likely inspire

lifelong commitment to the Army. It will also ensure the force is ready for the next

conflict in an era of hyper-change.

Army Training and Leader Development

Three domains comprise the Army Training and Leader Development Model:

Self-Development, Operational, and Institutional. These domains provide the basic

foundation for Army leaders to develop knowledge, skill, and experience to lead and

excel in a full spectrum, expeditionary environment.[19] This model remains relatively

unchanged since the onset of the GWOT. This section will define all three domains of

Army Training and Leader Development. It will identify flaws, recommend fixes, and

demonstrate potential outcomes for change. It will also describe the significance of

continuing leader development for the Army's Junior Leader population who will play an

increasingly vital role for the nation in a hyper-change environment.

The importance of analyzing legacy peacetime processes is not lost on our

military's Very Senior Leaders. As Admiral Michael G. Mullen, current Chairman of Joint

Chiefs of Staff recently wrote when identifying unit reset and reconstitution priorities: "we will identify and rapidly change peacetime processes to reflect a wartime footing with both the Joint Staff and in the Services."[20] Our military is in the business of developing our nation's leaders; therefore it is difficult to find a more important peacetime program to review and update than the Army's Training and Leader Development model. The generational traits, wartime experiences, and expectations of the Army's Junior Leaders demand nothing less.

Self-Development Domain. Current and past U.S. Army training and field manuals highlight Self-Development as an equal domain amongst the three. Self-Development is goal oriented learning that expands the depth and breadth of a leader's knowledge base. It is how a leader prepares for future positions and expands both their knowledge and experience from the institutional and operational domains.[21] However, Army doctrine only dedicates a scant few paragraphs to explaining this domain. By comparison, numerous pages, programs, and sub-programs describe the Institutional and Operational Domains.

Part of Self-Development occurs through the establishing of goals, self assessment, and individual study. However, the fact is that today's operational tempo, both while deployed and in garrison, provides little time for the officer to fully exploit this domain as defined. It is conceptually noble, but is not a true depiction of reality in today's force. Aspects of Self-Development do occur in the Senior Leader and Junior Leader force, but largely as a subset of the other domains. In reality it is not a co-equal domain in total leader development.

Self-Development was closer to a co-equal domain early in the career of a Very Senior Leader. It fit with their generational traits. They value structure, possess a high work ethic, and are comfortable with a checklist approach. It seems Very Senior Leaders were predisposed and content with their role in the self-development process of leader development throughout the course of a career. By contrast, today's Senior and Junior Leaders must contend with GWOT, Army Force Generation, Reset, and a host of deployment and garrison activities that dominate their work schedule. Generational traits predispose Senior and Junior Leaders to fight for time with family and peers during off duty hours versus using available free time for professional self-development activities.

If the Army truly wants the Self-Development leader domain to become relevant to Junior Leaders and co-equal to the Institutional and Operational domains, it must do so on their terms. First, allow Junior Leaders access to professional and personal self-development programs by the 10 year point of their career. These programs include but are not limited to college courses, advanced degree programs, fellowships, interagency or intergovernmental duty, etc. For this to occur, the Army must carve out the time to allow its leaders to grow in a non-operational or institutional construct. To hope that these pursuits will occur during non-duty time is unrealistic and shows a general misunderstanding of today's Millennial Junior Leaders, the environment they serve in, and what truly makes them tick.

The Army's Very Senior and Senior Leaders must not fall into the trap of developing a self-developmental broadening experience that satisfies their niche desires. Nor can they make the mistake of placing it rigidly in the officer career timeline

so that it becomes a data point on a checklist. It is easy to underestimate the broadening experience Junior Leaders gain executing key developmental and other jobs while deployed in support of GWOT. This experience exposes them to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations and organizations resulting in the most broadened junior leader population the Army has seen in generations.

Therefore, mandating a two or three year broadening assignment for senior Captains or junior Majors, experiences that satisfy Very Senior and Senior Leaders, is not necessary for Junior Leaders. Tour length broadening options are always available for segments of this population, however short duration options are more available to the force. A two to three month temporary duty experience to a JIIM organization, encompassing the broadening needs of the individual Junior Leader, is a great tool for commanders in the field. Mandating a one size fits all program from the top is not the answer. Resourcing and decentralizing an umbrella program to commanders with numerous options is a better fit.

This flexible tool will allow Senior Leader brigade and battalion commanders to target Junior Leader broadening needs and assist them with self-development and round out specific skill sets. The result is Junior Leaders who bring new perspectives and innovative ideas to their organizations and are ready to serve at the next echelon of leadership.

Another key facet of the Self-Development Domain is conducting self-assessments to evaluate competencies and determine strengths and weaknesses using feedback from leaders, mentors and peers.[22] This is a tremendous concept in theory,

but there is no formal system in place with teeth to ensure it occurs. Current systems only provide for feedback via efficiency reports and sporadic counseling from superiors. There is no system in place to ensure that leaders gain holistic, unfettered feedback from their superiors, peers, and subordinates. Without total feedback, leaders get an inflated view of their strengths with very little feedback on their weaknesses.

However, if peers and subordinates contribute to feedback in an anonymous fashion, it is far more likely a leader will digest realistic feedback on strengths *and* weaknesses on how to be a better leader. Therefore, the Army must formally adopt a 360 degree evaluation system. The institutions can phase the system in over time. The first phase ought to be Army wide implementation, but on a voluntary basis like the current program at the Army War College. Implementation is not difficult and is executable at the battalion level with on line tools. Unfortunately, statistics show very few Very Senior Leader Colonels participate in a free 360 degree view of their leader attributes. Not surprising given their generational slant toward mistrust. By stark contrast, Junior Leader Millennials possess a natural predilection for feedback and will embrace this tool. Initially utilizing a voluntary phase will also allow for system analysis, correction, and further recruitment prior to implementing future phases.

The second phase must include mandatory participation in the program Army wide for all NCOs and officers with feedback solely provide to the rated leader. Phase three will look the same as phase two except this feedback can now be integrated as a small portion of the formal Army evaluation system. In order to truly ensure leaders change, the Army must demonstrate that feedback from peers and subordinates is important. Millennial Junior Leaders thirst for such a system given their genuine desire

to work well in a team environment, please superiors, and be an integral part of successful mission accomplishment.

I do not advocate dismissing the opinions of their superiors who possess a broader perspective and level of experience. This remains predominant. However, the unique perspective peers and subordinates provide is additive and allows the Army to make a more holistic evaluation of its leaders.[23] This is vital for the development of Junior Leaders and only helps them keep their adaptive edge in an era of hyper-change. Recall, Junior Leader Millennials crave feedback, desire acceptance in groups and teams, yearn to please others, and want to do well. Holistic evaluations, like 360 degree, are a natural fit for their generation and they will embrace the feedback.[24]

Public speaking is also extremely important facet to self-development. In order to conduct a public speaking engagement, leaders need general knowledge of world and military current events. They must also understand their audience. Developing public speaking skills allows leaders to effectively translate facets of the global strategic environment to their units and Soldiers. It also promulgates Army strategic communication messages to non-military audiences around the world.

In this era of hyper-change where information sharing and media coverage dominate the senses, this talent will become a necessary foundational leader skill. As such, public speaking training and engagements for all leaders must be mandatory, not simply encouraged. The Army needs to immediately mandate, in every institutional school and unit, both active and reserve component, a formal public speaking program. To enhance the training, it is imperative that these programs also require practice through engagements with local community organizations and media outlets.

Battalion commander press interviews at Combat Training Centers (CTC) should not be the start point for Junior Leader exposure to media relations and public speaking. Too often Army Very Senior Leaders and Senior Leaders, as with their predecessors, are not comfortable with and do not seek out public speaking engagements. Their early Army experience and natural generational tendencies taught them to value quiet confidence and personal humility as hallmarks of their profession. These are values at odds with strategic communication and public speaking. Consequently they too often are ineffective when delivering the Army's strategic themes and messages and fall short in the service goal of perception shaping.[25]

Not surprisingly, the GWOT and Millennial generational experiences of Army Junior Leaders help them understand the importance of and necessity to thrive in civil-military and media relations. Junior Leaders know the world as a small, continuously interconnected public domain. They do not fully understand doctrinal strategic tenets. However, they observe how the military instrument of national power wields great influence over policy, strategy, JIIM operations, and the remaining instruments of national power. They not only recognize the power of strategic communication and perception shaping, but are naturally drawn to appreciate and thrive in this critical field of development for the modern leader. To facilitate self-development of these multifaceted skills, Army Very Senior Leaders and Senior Leaders ought to expand programs that expose Junior Leaders in public both home and abroad.

Formalizing the Self-Development domain through programs building on its current state will ensure rigor and accountability. The institution must not allow organizations to pay lip service to this often neglected domain. Full development of this

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domain by aligning resources with formal programs will capitalize on the traits our adaptive Junior Leaders gain through their GWOT experiences. After all, they are developing leaders in a hyper-changing global security environment. By changing, the Army reassures Millennial expectations of their self-image and the Army they serve. More importantly, the Army demonstrates it is cognizant of their needs and taking steps to keep pace.

Operational Domain. For purposes of today's strategic operating environment, the Operational Domain of leader training occurring in assignments to units includes combat deployment and service in garrison as part of the Army Force Generation Process. The Operational Domain includes leader responsibilities, unit training, major training exercises, and operational deployments.[26]

Operational deployments during GWOT are the primary reason our Millennial Junior Leaders acquire the traits the Army envisions for leaders of the future. Yet, the other Operational Domain facets- leader responsibilities, unit training and major training exercises- are detracting from developing these Junior Leaders.

There are zero days available for company commanders to plan and execute training according to a 2004 Army study. The finding concludes annually higher headquarters require 297 days of mandatory training to fit in the 256 days available to these leaders.[27] Today there is still no change. There remains hundreds of mandatory individual through collective pre-deployment training requirements. It forces higher headquarters to marshal both resources and time to meet the standards. They create training lanes for units to churn through prior to deploying and leave no room for creativity or empowering Junior Leaders.

Any training plan a Junior Leader makes is likely to be overcome by higher headquarters. Even six week training lock-in, a program designed by Very Senior Leaders to put rigor in the system, is failing. Unit training schedules are so full at every level that one change or cancellation has a calamitous effect on planned training events. Every staff level works on a much tighter time frame than the writers of Army training manuals foresaw. Worse, reaction is now as equal a part of training culture as planning.

Information technology makes it easier for commanders and staffs to produce detailed memos, briefs, email, guidance and orders for every level of the chain of command to follow. This produces a plethora of priorities to organize and manage just to make it through each day in garrison. Imagine, if you can, how many "Every Soldier" memorandums reach a squad by direction of each leader echelon, platoon leader though four-star general. Each contains their own share of guidance, tasks, priorities, and command emphasis. Add on the numerous directives, orders, policies, and mandates also emanating from these echelons and the sum is huge. It is simply too much.

The management pendulum is swinging too far toward the "micro" end of the spectrum. The Army must get back to a "two levels down" philosophy for issuing command guidance, directives, and orders while in garrison. After all, this is the construct Army's Junior Leaders operate and excel within during operational deployment situations. This is not undermining senior (command) authority to emphasize critical subjects to subordinates. However, so much is currently critical and mandatory that subjects of extreme importance get lost in the tidal wave of data.

Leaders at each level are in a quandary to make decisions on what truly is critical with very little room for their own priorities.

In order to get a handle on the explosion of requirements in the Army, the Chief of Staff should direct the Department of the Army G3/5/7 in conjunction with the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to undertake a top to bottom review of all mandatory training. The goal is to prioritize important training and cut 50% of the current requirements in order to give time back to company commanders. Given resources and sound guidance, the Army's Junior Leaders continue to demonstrate during GWOT that they can effectively utilize this time. With balanced oversight and structure they can generate innovative techniques and solutions for adaptive training scenarios. They can provide new thinking, challenging conditions, and unique variables to training that Army Very Senior and Senior Leaders simply cannot offer.

The Army's CTCs also deserve close study. Yes, they are the best combat training venues available to large units prior to an operational deployment. However, what's the real cost-benefit to a small unit? Are the time, personnel, equipment overhead, and funds to execute a brigade combat team (BCT) rotation worth the training benefits to a platoon or company? While the costs differ by unit and location, an average U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) BCT rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) costs $12-15 million to execute. This does not account for training time lost due to transit of equipment, 800 augmentee Soldiers from outside the rotational unit for Opposition Force and Observer-Controller augmentation, nor other rotational administrative and installation duties.[28]

Currently CTCs are the premier training venue for Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE) in preparation for GWOT deployment. Commanders are increasingly requesting small unit lane training for a portion of their rotational cycle. It is true most home stations cannot currently replicate the training environment like Army CTCs. What if the Army invests rotational dollars to build facilities to replicate these environments at major installations that support deployable units? If the Army creates robust regional and local training resource centers leaders will use them. With the capabilities plug and play training scenarios provide, Junior Leaders can innovate. They will use deployment inspired experience to create scenarios to train leaders and Soldiers to be agile and adaptive in a hyper-change environment. This is extremely powerful for both our Junior Leaders and their subordinates.

BCT and battalion staffs must continue to utilize the Leader Training Preparation (LTP) staff training capability the CTCs provide. However, they can also hone their skills by linking local live training via virtual and constructive simulations through installation Battle Command Training Centers. Additionally, other units no longer part of the planning, execution, or support for a CTC rotation are available for Theater Support Cooperation programs in support of Combatant Commanders. Units can also execute their craft in actual scenarios supporting theater shaping operations.

There are numerous benefits to executing BCT rotations at CTCs. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration tasks, field craft, stressful physical and mental conditions, integration of enablers, and the ability to conduct large unit, full spectrum operations without distraction to name a few. Additionally, the CTCs provide

the only world class venue where large scale Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) training can occur in a realistic environment.

The Army needs CTCs and the capability they provide. However, it must take a hard look at all the costs and benefits of current unit and leader Directed METL training demands. This requires examining the possibility of exporting or developing a portion of current CTC capabilities locally. Junior Leaders can better utilize and hone adaptive leader skills in a decentralized environment. There is value to gain both for the leader and the unit. Given resources and time, units can apply this same analysis to other home station training.

The reality of Junior Leader development under the operational domain when not in a deployment phase is it restrains innovative and agile traits the Army wants in Junior Leaders. Again, higher headquarters is not helping by stifling their opportunity to plan and execute imaginative training. The Army risks "dumbing down" its Junior Leaders if it does not create a training environment where they are free to plan distinctive training scenarios, execute autonomous operations, and lead their units in surroundings marked by challenging and changing conditions.

True top down changes in the Army only occur over long periods of time. It is too large a bureaucracy with numerous schools of thought to expect mandatory changes in leader training, especially in the Operational Domain, to happen quickly. For true change to occur, give freedom to lower echelon units at the battalion and company level. They possess the capability to focus on one training vision and the freedom to foster an innovative learning environment.[29] To achieve this, these units need time and resources.

Adopting a "two-levels down" philosophy, significantly reducing mandatory

training, and decentralizing plug-and-play training resource capabilities at the local level

will solve the problem. This gives Junior Leaders the time, flexibility, and resources to

develop adaptive training methods, stimulate agile thinking, and create innovative

solutions for conflict in today's era of hyper-change.

Institutional Domain. The Institutional Domain is training and education

conducted at the Army's initial and subsequent training base centers and schools and

support to the field.[30] Starting in 2001, TRADOC invested a great deal of effort to

overhaul initial military entry and unit functional training requirements to keep pace with

GWOT trends, Army modernization, and immediate needs of the force. The good news

is adjustment and progress in these areas continues. The bad news is they are further

ahead than the Army's officer Professional Military Education (PME) system.

The quality and depth of portions of the PME available for leaders since the

onset of GWOT is not keeping pace with the operational experience and depth of

strategic thinking leaders currently possess. The Command and General Staff College

(CGSC) as part of the Army's Intermediate Level Education (ILE) is an exception.

CGSC is making great strides in recent years to "teach up" to its population of Senior

Leader Xers who own a wealth of GWOT experience. As one graduate of CGSC in

2005 pointed out about the past curriculum:

> I believe more curriculum time should have been spent on joint and
> multinational operations, public speaking, and interagency
> capabilities…these are the areas where field grade officers have the most
> impact throughout the 8-10 years after leaving ILE. These changes were
> already heading this way as I was leaving.[31]

By way of comparison, survey respondents who graduated from CGSC in 2008 spoke

highly of the curriculum improvements since 2005, specifically touting the increased

focus on strategic thinking, theater strategy, joint and multinational operations, interagency capabilities, and strategic communication.

Unlike CGSC students, the Army's Millennial Junior Leaders who are recent graduates of the Captain's Career Course (CCC) expect much more from the CCC curriculum. They feel that it is a good refresher on doctrine and the science of warfare, yet left wanting for linkages to the operational and strategic level. They expect more practical exercises where they must implement what they learn and factor in the fog of war, complex decision making, and ever-changing conditions. A recent CCC graduate stated:

> Commanders at the company level need to know the details of strategic thinking. Most, if not all of their actions could potentially have second and third order effects that transcend into strategic efforts. Most importantly, gone are the days when only key (higher echelon) leaders are read in on the strategic consequences of tactical actions.[32]

Millennial Junior Leaders also understand the importance of operating in a JIIM environment that is critical to success in this era of hyper-change. Another recent CCC graduate states it best when discussing how the CCC curriculum must adapt to match the current capabilities and future needs of the Army's Millennial Junior Leaders:

> Battalion AOs in the GWOT are the "Ellis Island" of warfare. Rangers, SOF, CIA, FBI, USAID, and DIA are just a few of the organizations that a land owner partners with. There is an immediate and critical need to address these agencies at a CCC. You can't synchronize what you don't understand.[33]

Millennial Junior Leaders are asking questions about, have experiences in, and demand rigor about subjects that Senior and Very Senior Leaders only dealt with after the first decade of their career. Portions of the Army PME are adapting to the environment, however CCC's that support and educate Millennial Junior Leaders are significantly lagging. TRADOC must revamp the CCC curriculum to challenge these

leaders and broaden their thinking. They are ready and expect it. To not do so will stifle

their growth as leaders and demonstrate to them that an Army who wants adaptive

leaders is not willing to adapt its leader institutions toward that end.[34]

Conclusion

The U.S. Army must rapidly overhaul all three domains of its Training and Leader

Development program. If not, it will fail to keep up with the demands of a hyper-change

environment manifest by persistent conflict and the needs of its Millennial Junior

Leaders. The deployed operational force, and especially its Millennial Leaders,

understand this and live it every day of GWOT. The Army rightfully touts the need for its

leaders to be adaptive, innovative, and agile in thinking and mission execution. In order

for these leader skills to not atrophy, the Army as an institution must develop a truly

decentralized, expeditionary mindset.

Within the Self-Development domain the Army must adopt a 360 degree

evaluation system. Junior Leaders are drawn to it and will see it as a sign the Army is

also adapting. Provide brigade and battalion commanders resources and a wide menu

of broadening experience programs for Junior Leaders. They must be long and short in

duration and flexible enough for commanders to target the specific needs of each Junior

Leader in their organization. Lastly, formal programs on public speaking, media

engagement, and perception shaping throughout the Army will enhance critical skills

that Junior Leaders recognize as necessary in the current global environment.

Within the Organizational domain the Army must adopt a "two-levels down"

philosophy for guidance and orders. Doing this facilitates lifting the sheer burden of

requirements we demand from Junior Leaders at the company level. They have little

predictability and even less say in the training priorities of their organizations when not deployed. Lastly, the efficacy of the current Combat Training Center programs and their effect on Junior Leaders needs review. Decentralize training resources to unit installations as soon as feasible. There, Junior Leaders can use their imagination and innovate within live, virtual, and constructive training scenarios using plug and play menus of capabilities.

Within the Institutional domain the Army must continue to revise its PME curriculum at all levels of officer professional development. Gone are the days when leaders simply focused on their level of warfare and the military aspect of national power. The most important link in the officer PME chain is the first—the Captain's Career Course (CCC). This gains significance given the current student population. Junior Leaders Millennials with unique generational traits and GWOT experiences rightly demand far more from CCC. What better place for the Army to demonstrate that it is adapting along with Junior Leaders than by revamping the CCC curriculum.

Some Very Senior Leader Boomers recognize the current generational and situational differences that affect Army leaders and are leading the charge toward change. Senior Leader Xers who lived through a structured training development system can help. They experience firsthand the capabilities of Junior Leaders during GWOT and can assist in cutting out the bad and harnessing the good from this structure. However change must come from all sides of the Army: Generating (Institutional) to Operational, Strategic to Tactical, and vice versa for each. Evolving leader training and development will serve the adaptive qualities the Army expects of its

leaders, capitalize on the traits it's Millennial Junior Leaders learn during GWOT, and strengthen Army leadership for our nation well into the future.

Millennial Junior Leaders are most at risk if the Army and its Training and Leader Development process does not change. They continue to prove in combat that they possess both the knowledge and skills. They overcome their own negative generational traits and capitalize on specific generational traits to thrive during GWOT. The Army can ill afford to let these skills diminish and has little time to retain their attention and expand their expertise. If the Army does not change key aspects of the three Training and Leader Development domains, it will soon find itself with a dilemma. The Junior Leader officer corps who is committed to fighting GWOT may not commit to the Army as an institution in the long run. In a hyper-change era where triumph in conflict is increasingly more reliant on people than technology, successful accomplishment of U.S. National Security and Military Strategy will hinge on retaining and developing Army Junior Leaders.

<u>Endnotes</u>

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[16] General George W. Casey Jr., "Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Eisenhower Luncheon" speech, Association of the U.S. Army, Washington, DC, October 7, 2008.

[17] U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 Posture Statement, Addendum B (Train and Equip Soldiers to Serve and Grow Adaptive Leaders* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007) http://www.army.mil/aps/07/addendum/b.html (accessed October 13, 2008).

[18] Leonard Wong, *Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 2-3.

[19] U.S. Department of the Army, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, Field Manual 7-0 (Final Approved Draft) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, Released November 14, 2008, Official Date Pending), 3-5.

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21 U.S. Army, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, 3-6.

22 Ibid., 3-4.

23 Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, and Major Stephen M. Smith, U.S. Army, "Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future" *Military Review 87, no.5* (September-October 2007), 3.

24 Additionally, the Army should pursue a system that tracks subordinate Junior Leader retention for field grade Senior Leaders over the long term. By the time a Senior Leader Colonel is eligible for promotion to General Officer, patterns will develop that demonstrate whether Junior Leaders who worked for the Colonel over a period of several years are voting with their feet or are staying in the Army based on leadership climate. This should be an additional tool used to screen future Very Senior Leaders and will ensure that the Army is retaining and promoting leaders who value feedback and adapt their leadership based on 360 degree feedback.

25 Major General Lincoln Jones III, U.S. Army Retired, 1958 Year Group, interview by author, The Woodlands, TX, December 29, 2008.

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30 U.S. Army, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, 3-6.

31 Over 25 Captains and Majors were surveyed individually by the author in January, 2009 to gather feedback on their perceptions of the Captain's Career Course or the Command and General Staff College curriculum. The survey focused on addressing any perceived shortfalls in the curriculum at the Operational and Strategic level, specifically: Theater and National Strategy, Strategic Thinking, Strategic Leadership, Joint and Multinational Operations, Interagency Capabilities, and Public Speaking. The survey sample included officers from the Maneuver, Fire, and Effects, Operational Support, and Force Sustainment categories.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Each level of the Army's PME program for officers must continue to adapt over time. Millennial Junior Leaders will continue to operate in a global security environment marked by

increases in hyper-change. Army leaders will demand more from each level of Army PME throughout their career. Millennial Junior Leaders will demand more of the curriculum at CGSC and both Millennial Junior Leaders and Senior Leader Xers will demand more of the Senior Service College curriculum. Programs such as the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP) and the National Security Policy Program (NSPP) at the Army War College provide the rigor, level of thinking, and broadened perspective and experiences that will be expected by the Junior and Senior generational leaders. The Army should continue to elevate its institutional PME system and adapt to the capabilities and needs of its leaders as they adapt their thinking and skill set in this era of hyper-change.